2 IMCWP, Contribution of Russian Communist Workers' Party

6/23/00, 12:58 PM
  • Russia, Russian Communist Workers' Party 2nd IMCWP En Europe Communist and workers' parties

Russian Communist Workers' Party
by Victor Tiulkin

Esteemed comrades! It's the third time, the third year in a
row that we have met in Greece. This fact alone already
constitutes a step forward in achieving the unity of
communist forces, since any meeting, even if it does not
conclude with some sort of organizational form, nonetheless
constitutes a step towards mutual understanding, the
elucidation of positions and clarification of the
situation.
From this point of view, we must once more express
appreciation to our hosts, the Communist Party of Greece,
for the great task they have accomplished in making it
possible for such meetings to be attended and this step
forward to be taken, as well as for what was done after our
previous meetings, namely publishing the magazine and
organizing Solidnet, this indisputable beginning of
movement. (We could say: "The process has started!").
And we, the Russian Communist Workers' Party, express the
hope that this movement will be accelerated, because like
the greatest friction, as is well-known in physics - it is
friction at rest.
Practically no one denies the need for unity of the
communist movement. This need is dictated not only in the
main conclusion of the "Manifesto of the Communist party" -
"Workers of the world, unite!", not only in theory, but in
the practice of struggle as well. First and foremost is the
fact that our adversary - world capital - appears as a
single front, evidence of which is the so-called
globalisation process, which was analyzed in detail at our
meeting in 1999. Among other things is the fact that when
the pro-bourgeois parties unite and moreover unite in
Internationals, they do so openly and act quite
effectively, an example of which is the Socialist
International, and act not only by exchanging views on some
theoretical positions, but by struggling for their own
expansion worldwide. At least all social democratic and
socialist parties that are trying to rise in Russia have
straight away set entry into the Socialist International as
their direct task, connecting with this, among other
things, the hope for practical aid in the process of their
political evolution. It means that the need for unity is
dictated by both theory and practice.
Few people object to theoretically propounding the
necessity of unity of communist forces. But the
difficulties usually begin where some organizational form
of this unity is being discussed. And all of us understand
that without an organizational form and organisation it is,
if it is not entirely useless, at least not very effective
to discuss unity. It usually ends up in an exchange of
opinions on issues, on which, in any case, we do not have
big differences. We have exchanged opinions on
globalisation; everyone agrees that it is a new phase in
the development of imperialism, one more step taken by
reaction. One person has spoken in more detail, another
made the analysis from a different angle. And if the matter
of parties and communists acting in the whole world as a
united entity is being debated, here the main subject of
discussion is, first of all, what organizational form
should be given to this unity.
Both supporters and adversaries of achieving unity
recollect more often than anything else the experience of
the previous Internationals, especially the Third, which,
in fact, existed for a quarter of a century. The
adversaries of unity are especially frightened by those
negative points which, from their point of view, existed in
the history of the Third International. To indicate them
one often uses such terms as suppression of independence of
the communist parties of different countries - when
everybody is reduced to the same level, not taking into
consideration local conditions, pressure and diktats from
big parties (All-Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)
and so on.
Perhaps, or even certainly, mistakes did take place, only
these mistakes and drawbacks were something like elements
of work - one who does not work, does not make mistakes: if
there are no attempts made, there are no mistakes
Besides we should note that the Communist International
really was a united party and point number one of its
Statutes stated that "the Communist International
constitutes a union of communist parties of separate
countries, a united world Communist party".
Recognizing the fact that the first experience undoubtedly
entailed mistakes, we should underline that it brought huge
achievements as well, achievements which have not been
surpassed until today and, it seems, will not even be
repeated in the near future. It suffices to say that in the
middle of the thirties the fascist regimes of Germany,
Italy and Japan saw as their main adversary in the struggle
to reallocate the world not only and perhaps not so much
the USSR, as the Communist International. And in 1936, as
is well-known, they concluded an Anticomintern pact. It was
an unprecedented case in world history, when the largest
powers of the world united at the state level to struggle
against an international working class organisation. This
example of itself confirms the positive evaluation of the
operation of the Third International, the need for
communist forces to unite today.
Today the fact that there are serious ideological
differences that slow down the process is cited as one of
the reasons against the idea of setting up a Communist
International. Is that not so? Certainly, it is. We
consider it necessary to express the thought that
overcoming differences implies not only discussions,
understanding, rapprochement of positions, but, equally
important, a demarcation of positions. And there are cases
when it simply becomes necessary.
As we know from history, mutual relations between
social-democrats and communists have always constituted a
big problem. We know that in the long run all this actually
came down to ideological differences which were expressed
in practical politics, when social-democrats held
anti-communist, as well as anti-Soviet positions. However,
given all the complexity of mutual relations between
social-democrats and communists, we would like to express
the thought that mutual relations between communists and
transformed communists constitute an even bigger problem
today, at least for the communists. By transformed
communists we mean those who live in the shell of the
communist movement with a communist name, but whose views
are already separated from orthodox theory by such a
distance that the question of the form(name) comes to the
fore. We should stress here that we put the question in
this way not because we are superorthodox in some way, not
because we are the most dedicated to the idea or pretend to
be pure in some special way, but because the main feature
of communism is its scientific character. Communism is,
after all, a science and it is based on objective laws of
development and, correspondingly, reflects the reality
which exists objectively without distortions. And today we
should register, without distortion, a fact which exists in
the communist movement: the existence of the so-called
multitude of communist parties, which gives rise to party
differences. It would be better to state directly that in
principle we are different from certain parties. And the
main thing is that we are different from their ideological
positions of abandoning the principle of proletarian
dictatorship, that the quota for revolutions has been
exhausted, recognizing the theory of civil consensus and
social partnership - signs known to everybody that the
movement is ailing.
It was demonstrated most clearly in 1999, when NATO
committed aggression against a sovereign country. How can
one tolerate some parties within the framework of the
communist movement expressing a position even of consent,
to say nothing of approval! -over the aggression of NATO
against Yugoslavia. It is an example of parties setting
themselves outside the framework of the movement due to
their actions, and this delimitation should be registered
and consolidated.
It is important to note that these differences do not
follow the national borders at all. The issue is not that
the Russian Communist Party, for example, does not agree
with the French one. These differences have an ideological
character and can be observed in every country and even
inside a single party. Our point of view is that in Russia
this picture is perhaps expressed better than anywhere
else. We should say directly that in the meantime
Gorbachev�s line is alive and well. The course towards the
market, to making the country capitalist, towards
privatization was set by the 28th Congress of the CPSU. But
after 1991 as well, after the counter-revolutionary
upheaval, we should not think that full sobriety has come
and that this course has been left somewhere there in the
past. It continues today as well.
In our programme objectives of 1991-1999 we proceeded from
the fact that a revolutionary situation is possible in
Russia. We connected this possibility to two factors.
First: the memory of Soviet times is still alive in Russia
and in CIS republics, where rather broad strata of the
population still remember their own experience and know
what existed, what we had achieved, with all the
shortcomings which existed as well. Second: the continuing
deterioration of the situation for the majority, first of
all for the working strata, and forced social
stratification on the basis of property. We connected the
probability of forming a revolutionary situation to these
factors. Today, after 1998-99 we should say that this
probability is considerably decreasing and, on the
contrary, reaction has been reinforced greatly. It has been
reinforced from many points of view, with the assistance of
the left so-called civilised constructive opposition, which
calls itself communist. As is well-known, under our
conditions the need (not the admission, but precisely the
need) for multiple modes of production in the economy as
being substantial features of socialism is persistently
added to the other parties' aforementioned programme
positions, which are classic manifestations of opportunism
and revisionism: the abandonment of the dictatorship of the
proletariat and of revolutionary targets, reliance on
consensus and class cooperation, as is likewise added the
ideology of so-called state patriotism, totally cut off
from the class character of the state machinery, while the
features of true people' s power are attributed to the
bourgeois parliament.
These problematic differences, which have dragged on since
Gorbachev' s time and whose roots can be traced in
alignment with "democratic socialism with a human face",
towards market socialism - wind up in practice in the most
acute quarrels. In 1993, at the moment when the social
crisis became exacerbated, after the shooting in the
Supreme Soviet of Russia(which was already
bourgeois-democratic), at the moment when both theory and
historical practice dictated the need precisely for the
situation to become exacerbated, Gorbachev's component in
the communist movement proceeded to conciliation and
participation in the elections at a time when the orthodox
communists were in favour of a boycott, something which was
quite possible.
After all, the idea of these elections on the part of
Yeltsin was in order: to wash out the traces of the crime,
to give the semblance of legitimacy and even of democracy
to the Russian regime. And in concert the people who call
themselves communists, by taking part in these elections,
helped Yeltsin not only to undergo a political facelift,
but also to push through a Constitution which they
themselves curse and call anti-popular today.
In 1998 the objective law that in periods of crisis the
revolutionary component of the movement proceeds to
aggravate the situation and the opportunistic one - to
smooth it over was manifested again. When Kirienko' s
government devalued the ruble, in fact the second
large-scale robbery of the people after Gaidar took place
(the ruble then fell three times), but instead of
proceeding to aggravate the situation, the parliamentary
opposition, including the "left", as it called itself,
helped to smooth it over: they supported the government of
so-called common sense - Primakov's.
We consider that in 1999, just before 2000, when reaction
made a strategic move- it sacrificed Yeltsin in order to
keep on course choosing Putin as his successor and
proceeded to forced elections with a reduced term - we also
should have proceeding to aggravate the situation: all
opposition forces should have adopted boycott tactics. It
was quite possible. Instead of this, playing according to
the regime' s rules, in fact they assisted Putin to become
"elected nationwide". Today we should say in a
straightforward way that reaction in Russia has
significantly reinforced its positions both in Parliament
and inside executive power systems and from the point of
view of broadening its own social base.
The examples we gave confirm that objective reality
dictates the need to separate and not to be afraid to do
so. This does not mean "to quarrel and to spit at each
other" or that common meetings and discussions where
everybody will express his point of view cannot take place.
This is quite possible, but those who understand the
process in the same way, who hold marxist-leninist
positions, have not given up the basic points of the
teaching that they should not be hindered by the existence
of those who hesitate. They can and should unite without
looking back at some "timid" reasons which have their roots
in "the years 1937-40".
One of the main directions for action of this communists'
union which should be forming must be development of the
labour movement, with unification of efforts in this field.
We shall turn again to the second point in the Communist
International Statutes: "The Communist International -
International Workers' Association - constitutes a union of
communist parties of separate countries in a united world
Communist party". Today we cannot boast even of having the
degree of unity of the international communist movement
which existed at one time, we cannot give practical
examples of large-scale political solidarity strikes, of
having united strike funds or even of simply organizing an
appropriate exchange of experience.
We shall draw one small picture, as Vladimir Ilich used to
say, "one small picture to clear up big issues" (he wrote a
work thus entitled) on the example of Russia, on the
example of struggle of the collective of Vyborg integrated
pulp-and-paper mill, which is famous in our country. It is
well-known that in Russia all the privatisation constituted
pilfering, robbery of the united people's economy complex,
when huge assets were sold for ridiculous sums of money,
when in one or two years fortunes worth billions of dollars
were put together. The integrated pulp-and-paper mill in
Vyborg had the same lot - it was privatised as well, then
it changed hands several times. When the workers, who were
driven to despair by their wretched situation saw that the
mill was being destroyed on purpose to compete on the
world market, they rejected both domestic claimants to
property and foreign benefactors. They took the mill into
their own hands, established a form of people's enterprise,
launched production, which had been at a standstill for a
year, found partners, suppliers of raw materials, and sales
channels. They heroically withstood strong attacks by
property claimants and the authorities. Extremely violent
skirmishes with special detachments took place. They shot
at people, the skirmishes proceeded with the use of weapons
and there were wounded and injured. Then the workers did
not yield, the solidarity which we had managed to create in
the area with the assistance of the RCWP involving the
labour collectives of the Leningrad metal works and the
integrated colour printing mill alone with the squad of the
Leningrad workers' Soviet helped them to hold out. They
carried out a whole complex of united actions - setting up
road-blocks, picketing the regional government, keeping
round-the-clock watches around the factory. The "gentlemen"
gave up. But in any case, that which could not be decided
by means of force, by shooting and the
"Typhoon"detachments, reaction managed to carry out
through economic blockade, by methods of splitting and
bribery. They did not manage to take it directly; they
imposed an economic blockade on the mill - froze the bank
accounts, blocked raw material supplies and indeed stopped
production and over half a year brought people to the point
that workers' families began to starve. Because the
boiler-room stopped operating(there was no fuel oil), their
apartments were cold. And the main thing is that the
workers lost their faith in the possibility of help coming
from the authorities, parliaments or oppositionists
belonging to power structures. After that the capitalists
proposed to those who would take the side of the new
"masters" that they would be paid their salaries and
commuting expenses. The mass resistance stopped in half a
year. The people agreed, since the resources they had for
this resistance were exhausted. Nevertheless many people
from the Russian opposition said that it showed the essence
of Russian workers who had been bought out. We are obliged
to talk about that at a time when in order to "buy people
out" by paying something to them, only 40-50 thousand
dollars were spent. And the whole united opposition did not
happen to have this sum so as to support the resistance.
Though during the elections a whole series of parties which
call themselves "resistance parties" spent sums which are
many times larger than this. That is, the fact that the
interests of parliamentary oppositionists, including
parliamentary communists, are situated on another plane
than is the workers' resistance manifested itself once
more. They do not accept the workers' movement or
understand it and they view it with disdain.
And this example is unique and meaningful for Russia.
Incidentally, the struggle for the integrated
pulp-and-paper mill continues today as well. It is being
waged by the Committee for Solidarity Actions, which was
established in the heat of the action by a group of its
workers who were not crushed.
The whole struggle is being waged taking into consideration
the way in which privatisation was conducted: some people
say that this matter should be reconsidered, with
nationalisation, with what has been stolen taken back. And
the governments which alternate, including Putin' s, have
as their main position that "privatisation will not be
reconsidered". That is why it is the most important example
for Russia. It was a touchstone. Here the workers laid
claim to the most sacred thing for those in power:
property. It was an example of the most heroic, the most
acute struggle, it was the first and most striking example
in a series that began - since several dozen similar
actions took place in Russia during 1999. The truth is that
these took place on another scale and in other forms, less
acute, but nevertheless Well, the inability of the whole
opposition to support this particular example, the
inability to help really kindle a flame from this spark -
this is that "small picture" which helps us to clear up one
big issue which we have not yet learnt to resolve in
Russia. Before we learn to do so, certainly we cannot even
talk about a revolutionary situation and a crossroads.
Everything will boil down to a changeover in parliamentary
seats.
That is why, summing up everything I have said, the Russian
Communist Workers' Party supports organizational forms of
unity, following this path, including, if need be, certain
demarcations. It proposes to take the following step
towards establishing a Coordinating Council of the
Communist Parties. After an exchange of information, the
joint publication of theoretical journals and so on we must
move towards coordinating the workers' movement.
In the struggle we shall unite!